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| Registros recuperados: 47 | |
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| Crowe, Bronwyn; White, Benedict. |
| Conservation and restoration of native vegetation is often a gradual process which may require many years to transform an ecosystem from one vegetative state to a target ecosystem. This process is stochastic, with some changes potentially irreversible. In contrast, contracts with landholders to undertake conservation measures on their property are typically for less than ten years and often make no contingencies for re-contracting at the end of the contract period. The risk to land holders and conservation agencies of contracts not being renewed and the consequent potential loss of previous investment means including covenants in conservation contracts may be attractive to both parties. A model is developed to empirically examine the optimal dynamic... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: POMDP; Biodiversity; Contracts; Monitoring; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9457 |
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| Mizumoto, Fabio Matuoka; Zylbersztajn, Decio. |
| This study investigates the reasons which lead the companies to keep simultaneous vertical integrated, third part and hybrid distribution channels. Companies establish different coordination structures, the organizational arrangements, which determine how the agents involved cooperate to the development of distribution activities, according to Transaction Cost Economics and Dynamic Competence. Even choosing different distribution channels, why the company does not establish one single organizational arrangement? What factors may justify the establishment of different arrangements? Possible explanations to those questions have been pointed out in multiple distribution channels. The empirical research indicates that firms establish multiple efficient... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Distribution channels; Poultry industry; Contracts; Organizational arrangements.. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43813 |
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| Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
| Dairy managers today are faced with the decision to either raise their own replacements on the dairy farm or send heifers to a custom heifer grower. The largest potential challenge of contracting out the heifer raising enterprise revolves around the potential for a moral hazard problem because of hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms which provide incentives for the custom heifer grower to perform accelerated growth without heifers becoming over-conditioned. In order to provide incentives to custom growers, heifers returned to the dairy farm should be compared in performance to other heifers of similar age. We solve for the price paid per pound of gain, price paid for inch... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Farm management; Production economics; Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6077 |
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| Olynk, Nicole J.; Wolf, Christopher A.. |
| As dairy farms grow and specialize in milking cows, raising replacement heifers is increasingly outsourced. Perhaps the largest challenge of outsourcing the heifer enterprise involves quality, measured as milk production potential, and the possibility for moral hazard due to hidden action on the part of the custom heifer grower. A principal-agent framework was used to elicit contract terms to provide incentives for the heifer grower to achieve desired growth rates, and enable the return of the heifer to the dairy farm on an accelerated time frame, without sacrificing quality. To mitigate incentive asymmetries, bonuses and deductions are proposed. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Heifer growth; Moral hazard; Principal agent; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/99109 |
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| Pereira, Sandra Mara; Freire Junior, Weimar da Rocha; Miele, Marcelo; Da Silva Lobo, Debora. |
| Este artigo tem a intenção de analisar contratos da suinocultura sob a óptica da Nova Economia Institucional. O referencial teórico adotado foi a NEI, que fornece os conceitos dos atributos das transações que foram observados nos contratos. Como metodologia, foram analisados contratos referentes à integração para terminação (engorda) de suínos, de quatro empresas situadas na Região Sul do Brasil. Observou-se que os contratos de integração (ou parceria) têm sido um importante instrumento, tanto para as empresas processadoras, que podem contar com a produção constante e em padrões previamente especificados, quanto para os produtores rurais, que têm na suinocultura, uma atividade que lhes garante venda certa e recebimento garantido. Os contratos de integração... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Nova Economia Institucional; Contratos; Atributos das Transações; Suinocultura; New Institutional Economics; Contracts; Attributes of the Transactions; Production of Pigs; Livestock Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/102221 |
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| Nadolnyak, Denis A.; Fletcher, Stanley M.; Revoredo-Giha, Cesar. |
| In the paper, alternative contractual arrangements between crop producers and processors are evaluated with a view of addressing the major issues present in peanut markets in the U.S., the major EU supplier of high quality peanuts. The issues are the thinness of the spot markets and the absence of quality premiums, both of which impair market efficiency. Results indicate that introducing contracts with a system of quality differentials creates incentives for producer self-selection to participate in the post harvest cash market. Moreover, in the presence of sufficiently high common production risk, tournament contracts are more efficient and preferred by the producers than the standard fixed premium schedules. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Tournaments; Efficiency; Spot markets; Peanuts; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24703 |
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| Borch, Odd Jarl; Roaldsen, Ingrid H.E.. |
| In this paper we discuss the relations between the increased quality standards of traditional food products and the structuring and management of the value chain. We address the importance of different quality dimensions, and how they are combined in superior strategic configurations to achieve competitive advantage in particular in up market segments. We elaborate on the competitive positioning tools and the resource configuration of the value chain necessary for creating sustainable competitive advantage for small and medium-sized enterprises. We present results from 11 in-depth interviews with representatives from the fragmented Norwegian value chain for lamb products. The results show that to achieve customer-oriented differentiation focus effect and... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Quality differentiation; Value chain; Configuration; Management; Contracts; Agribusiness; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7857 |
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| Bontems, Philippe. |
| We explore in this paper the consequences of status seeking preferences among agents contracting with a private principal in the context of production. We examine in particular the case of envy and we show that in general envy entails augmented distortions due to asymmetric information in optimal contracts. Furthermore if the principal neglects the preferences of the agents with respect to status, then potentially there is under-participation to the contract. We also show that if the principal is free to choose who can participate to the contract, then under some conditions the principal may prefer to contract with only a subset of potentially "profitable" agents (that is where his utility is strictly positive). We then ask whether contracting with agents... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Status; Adverse selection; Contracts; Envy; Externalities; Production Economics; D6; H0; D86. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49507 |
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| Lema, Daniel. |
| This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We contend that in a context of modern agriculture, with well defined property rights, agricultural contracts must balance costs and benefits, aligning tenant and landlord incentives towards a similar objective. The study debates the potential effects of tenancy status and duration of contracts, over soil conservation and input use. We present empirical evidence about the effects over the soil and input use in tenant (fixed rent or sharecropping) and owner-operator farms using farm level data from the 2002 National Agricultural Census of Argentina. The empirical results show some differential effects but do not support a general and clear negative effect for... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Contracts; Agriculture; Transaction Costs; Sharecropping; Property Rights; Land Tenancy; Production Economics; D2; Q15. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25420 |
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| Bakucs, Lajos Zoltan; Ferto, Imre; Szabo, Gabor G.. |
| In this paper we present an empirical analysis of farmers’ contracting choice in the Hungarian milk sector using 2005 milk producer survey data, employing transaction cost economics. We focus on analysing some key determinants of farmers’ contracting choices: type of contracts, duration, number of contractors, incentives provided in the contract and business history of farmers and buyers. Some of the main results include the importance and effect of farm size, quantity of milk delivered, planned short and long run or contract related investment on farm, the possibility of farmer to influence prices on the contracting choices. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Transaction costs; Contracts; Milk products; Hungary; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90794 |
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| Lima, Ricardo Chaves; Irmao, Jose Ferreira. |
| The theory of contracts assumes that human nature is essentially opportunistic, and economic agents protect themselves against adverse selection and moral hazard by elaborating contracts. In the case of irrigated areas in the Brazilian northeast, such contracts are not necessarily formal. That is, arrangements based on economic agent’s word are common. The data used are from acerola producers in the Petrolina-Juazeiro irrigation project. The empirical model was tobit, given that the dependent variable was characterized by a truncated distribution. The results showed that the decision to engage on contractual relations is fundamentally defined by the degree of dependence of the farmer in respect to the processing industry. Furthermore, past experience of... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Vertical coordination; Contracts; Irrigation; Tobit model; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56813 |
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| Registros recuperados: 47 | |
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